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required, allowing space for analyzing the dynamics and
the progress of a negotiation, as well as the “transforma-
tions in identities and interests” (p. 279) that, he suggests,
are the product of shifting intersubjective understandings
among the actors involved.
There is no doubt, however, that Singh’s theory should
command serious attention. It aims to blend the insights
of both structural theories of strategic interaction and
constructivist arguments about the generation of identi-
ties. The relative power or capabilities of actors prior to a
negotiation is not, he argues, the sole determinant of its
outcome, nor are the preferences of those actors given
and fixed. What happens during a negotiation matters,
too: Power relations can be reconfigured and interests
modified as external circumstances change or actors adopt
new tactics. For Singh, even the “identities” of actors can
be transformed, as what he calls “meta-power” shifts inter-
subjective understandings of roles and positions. New or
newly acknowledged information can thus change the
preferences of actors. To take his own example, bringing
developing states in from the margins of trade negotia-
tions prompted an eventual modification in their stance
in the Uruguay Round discussions on services. At first
obstructive, with time these states became constructive
negotiating partners as they began to recognize the new
regard in which they were held by the developed world
(pp. 287–88). The possibility that the processes of diplo-
macy can produce such “new epistemic understandings”
underpins the author’s enthusiasm, in his conclusion, for
“negotiations-as-global-governance”—the nurturing of the
diplomatic process with a view to building the kind of
legitimacy, accountability, and even democracy on which
stable governance might rest.
There is an old-fashioned ring to Singh’s claim that
diplomacy might serve as the best means of “resolving
international conflicts” (p. 280) and even as an ideal form
of global governance (p. 291). The notion that the very
processes of diplomacy could act as a “civilizing” force on
states and other actors—to use the terms of an older dis-
course of global governance—is common to much writ-
ing on the topic in the first half of the last century (e.g.,
see Sir Ernest Satow, AGuide to Diplomatic Method, 1917).
The contemporary version of this argument relies less on
ideas of civilization and more on what might be called the
“stickiness” of those “networks” that draw in and hold
actors into processes of negotiation. The old and new
enthusiasts for diplomacy remain vulnerable, however, to
the charge that there continues to be very little to prevent
powerful actors from eschewing communication in favor
of outright coercion, and that civilizing processes and net-
works do little to prevent such behavior. Singh is acutely
aware of this problem: He rightly notes that negotiation
works best where power is diffused—but how it might be
addressed in a system of ever more concentrated power
remains unclear.
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For the past decade, Antje Wiener has been at the fore-
front of constructivist theorizing on international norms,
European integration, and constitutionalism beyond the
state. In her work, she has put forward a radically nonre-
ified concept of international norms, which she regards as
subject to context-dependent (re)interpretation and polit-
ical contestation. The Invisible Constitution of Politics puts
these ideas to an empirical test. It also tackles a highly
topical real-world challenge for the European Union. Here,
social interactions and political authority have expanded
beyond the state to such an extent that constitutionaliza-
tion has firmly established itself on the political agenda.
At the same time, however, it is a politically contested
process in which different constitutional principles for the
EU confront one another—see, for example, the failed
referenda on the recent treaty revisions.
What is the “invisible constitution”? Wiener distin-
guishes among three dimensions of norms: their formal
validity (e.g., through the ratification of legal documents),
their social recognition (e.g., in social practices implement-
ing the norm), and their cultural validation, which she
describes as the “active component that reflects and con-
stitutes the meaning that is actually in use” (p. 6). These
meanings attached to constitutional norms, which form
the cultural background of a constitution (often without
the citizens being aware of it), comprise the invisible con-
stitution. In Wiener’s view, it is this constitution that poses
the biggest problems for constitutionalization beyond the
state: Even if governments succeed in agreeing on formal
rules, the meanings and interpretations attached to them
may vary substantially and spur contestation. It is the pur-
pose of this book to make this invisible constitution visi-
ble, that is, to reconstruct and map the “meanings-in-use”
of European constitutional norms.
The study is designed as a comparative discourse analy-
sis of norm interpretations in three areas of EU policy—
the Schengen policy of free movement of persons,
enlargement, and constitutional politics—by two groups
of nationals (British and German) in three contexts (two
domestic, Berlin and London, and one transnational, Brus-
sels). This setup allows Wiener to study how meanings
vary according to the context of interaction (national or
transnational) for groups with the same cultural back-
grounds. She formulates four theoretical expectations for
this constellation. According to the “national identity”
expectation, the British and the Germans will attach dif-
ferent meanings to European norms regardless of the con-
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community” hypothesis assumes convergent meanings
across all contexts. The “layer-cake” assumption expects
elite convergence at the transnational level, and the “rules-
in-practice” assumption favored by the author expects
divergence between capitals and Brussels for the same
national groups.
On the basis of 53 interviews with academics, journal-
ists, and policymakers (10 for each national group in
Brussels, 20 Berliners, and 13 Londoners), Wiener con-
cludes that Berliners and Londoners attach different mean-
ings to European norms—mostly in line with national
political culture and divergent ideas of Europe. In Brus-
sels, however, meanings are more diffuse (without actu-
ally converging), and differences are blurred. This finding
is in line with the rules-in-practice assumption and is
used to generate a working hypothesis as the core result
of the study: “In the absence of all-encompassing tran-
snationalisation, international politics is constitutive for
more rather than less diversity. International encounters
are therefore expected to generate conflict and contesta-
tion” (p. 195).
Unfortunately, the analysis suffers from a number of
problems that make it difficult to sustain these conclu-
sions. First, it is unclear whether the discourse analysis
really taps the meanings of norms. In contrast to constitu-
tional politics, the connection between Schengen and the
citizenship norm, or enlargement and the norms of democ-
racy and the rule of law, is not straightforward. Many
keywords used to analyze the responses have only weak or
unclear links to these norms (e.g., compliance, fairness,
inclusion, integration, wealth export, and finality in the
enlargement case). The results, therefore, often seem to
reflect meanings or evaluations of policies, rather than mean-
ings of norms. To be sure, the meanings of policies may
also be colored by distinct cultural backgrounds, but they
are not necessarily normative meanings and do not neces-
sarily reflect contested norms.
Second, the study works with an extremely low num-
ber of observations. Displaying the results as percentages
and talking about 10% or less as “a few” (p. 104) is
misleading if 10% is actually a single respondent. More
troubling is the use of these numbers for the opposition-
deriving exercise from which the qualitative conclusions
are drawn. In the case of the Berliners, almost no conno-
tation is based on a majority of respondents; sometimes
utterances of just one or two respondents are taken as
representative for the entire sample (e.g., pp. 135–36,
141, 146). In general, small or insignificant quantitative
differences are inflated to represent categorical national
divides; sometimes, however, the results are simply turned
upside down. In the enlargement case, Wiener describes
Londoners as “quite happy with the reference to the Euro-
pean Union as a club that works based on the principle
of fairness” (p. 131), although more Londoners (and as
many Londoners as Berliners) are concerned with “com-
pliance” than with “fairness.” Moreover, in contrast with
the rules-in-practice assumption, the differences between
British and German Brusselites are more pronounced here
than those between Londoners and Berliners. Across all
issues, the only conclusion one can safely draw from the
numbers is that British Brusselites hold more diffuse views
than do Londoners.
Even if one accepted the empirical conclusions for a
moment, they would not necessarily support Wiener’s theo-
retical assumptions and working hypothesis. For one, the
study does not take self-selection into account. We simply
cannot know whether the more diffuse meanings held by
Brusselites are a result of their transnational interactions
or of prior, less “national” attitudes, which in turn made
them more likely to go to Brussels. This mechanism and
the resulting bias have long been diagnosed and con-
firmed in studies of international socialization in Europe—
but, unfortunately, the book ignores them completely.
Finally, the pessimism of the “working hypothesis” appears
unwarranted: Whereas international politics may lead to a
contestation of meanings embedded in national political
cultures, it also makes these meanings more diffuse and,
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